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NOTEs AND COMMENTS
AGENCY
COMMANDEERED SERVANT NOT IN THE SCOPE
OF EMPLOYMENT
The plaintiff was injured by the defendant's servant while pursuing
a traffic violator at the command of a police officer. Held, the servant
was not in the scope of his employment.'
The duty to aid in law enforcement when called upon is incumbent
upon all persons. 2 And such persons may be liable for their negligent
acts while so aiding an officers although the quantum of care may
be less than under ordinary circumstances. 4 This duty is obligatory
upon corporations.5 However, since a corporation can act only through
agents, the question of its liability in the negligent performance of
that duty depends on whether the doctrine of respondeat superior in-
eludes the activities of employees comandeered to aid in law enforcement
From analogous authority, at least three arguments can be made
for holding the defendant liable. First, workmen's compensation lia-
bilityG and the responsibility for acts of agents are based on similar
principles.8 Thus a taxicab driver injured when commandeered for law en-
forcement service recovered workmen's compensation for he remained
in the scope of his employment. 9 If the servant remains in the scope
of his employment for the purposes of workmen's compensation, he
should also remain for purposes of liability to third persons'o While
workmen's compensation statutes are always liberally construed,11 in
1 Balinovic v. Evening Star Newspape3 Co. 113 F. (2d) 505 (App.
D.C. 1940), cert. denied 61 S. C. 42 (1940).
2 Dougherty v. State, 106 Ala. 63, 17 So. 393 (1895).
sJones v. Melvin, 293 Mass. 9, 199 N. E. 392 (1936); Notes (1925)
39 A. L. R. 1306, (1922) 18 A. L. R. 197; (1936) 16 B. U. L.
Rev. 484.
' Hall v. Hepp, 210 App. Div. 149, 205 N.Y. Supp. 474 (4th Dep't 1924)
State v. Gorham, 110 Wash. 330, 188 Pac. 457 (1920).
5 Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N. E. 726 (1928).
GKansas City Fibre Box Co. v. Connell, 5 F. (2d) 398 (C.C.A. 8th,
1925); Tunnicliff v. Bettendorf, 204 Iowa 168, 214 N.W. 516 (1927);
see HARPER, LAW TORTS (1933) § 207; Bohlen, A Problem in
the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts (1912) 25 Harv.
L. Rev. 328.
7 See Smith, Frolic and Detour (1923) 23 Col. L. Rev. 444, 716; Doug-
las, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38
Yale L. J. 584, 720; Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability (1916)
26 Yale L. J. 105.8 Two of the more important reasons given for both are: (1) since the
carrying on of an industry inevitably results in injuries to em-
ployees and to third persons, this burden should be borne by those
who receive the immediate benefits of the enterprise; (2) the
industry can better distribute the loss.
O Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N. E. 726 (1928).
10 See Mr. Judge Rutledge, dissenting in Balinovic v. Evening Star
Newspaper Co., 113 F. (2d) 505, 510 (App. D. C. 1940). But see
note (1939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 497.
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an action by third persons, aliy doubt as to scope of employment will
be resolved against the employer.12
Secondly, placing liability on the defendant is in line with the in-
creasing social demand for holding owners of automobiles liable for the
iiegligence Of those driving theit cAit with the owner's eongent.19 The
duty of the corporation to surrender the truck might well be held
to constitute consent within the meaning of these statutes. 4  Siiice
thete are other possible grounds for holding the defendant liable, the
court should give effect to this general legislative policy.1 5
Third, maniy *iters suggest that liability should be imposed on thd
master for all probable and foreseeable acts done by the servant in
view of what he was employed to do,'8 Since all persons and corpora-
tions are subject to the duty to aid in law enforcement when called
upon, the possibility of the servant being called on to aid is a risk
incidental to the control of the truck and hence a forseeable result of
the driver's employment. It being a foreseeable result, the employer
11 General Atcid. Fire and Life Assut. Corp., Ltd. V. Crowell, 16 F.
(2d) 341 (C.C.A. 5th) 1985); Empire Health and Aedid. Ittigri
Co. va Purcellj 76 Ind. App. 551, 132 N.E, 664 (1921).
22 Robards v. Bannon Sewer Pipe Co., 130 Ky. 380, 118 S.W. 429 (1908);
Cook v. Michigan Cent. Ry., 189 Mich. 456, 156 N.W. 541 (1915);
Nees v. Julian Goldman Stores Inc., 106 W. Va. 502, 146 S. E. 61
(1928). The scope of employment for respondeat stiperiot has had
a rapid expansion since the turn of the centuryj and the tendency
today is to continue this expansion. See Seavey, Speculations as to
'Respondeat Superior" in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS (184) 433, 451.
Is For a comprehensive discussion of the extent and construction of
statutes imposing such liability, see note (1934) 88 A.L.R, i74.
In 1937, four years after the accident in the principal case, such
a statute was passed for the District 6f Columbia.
USea Mr. Judge Rutledge, dissenting in Balinovic v. Evening Star
Newspaper Co., 113 F. (2d) 505, 511 (App. D.C. 1940).
15 This argument is in effect an application of the ancient doctrine of
"Equity of the Statute" supposedly rejected in the United States.
However under the guise of interpretation the result reached is
often times the same. Two of the best examples are: (1) the
extension of tort liability as a result of a statute imposing crim-
inal liability for a certain act, Annis v. Britton, 232 Mich. 291,
205 N.W. 128 (1925); Abounader v. Stohmeyer and Axpe Co.,
243 N.Y. 458, 154 N.E. 309 (1926); Landis, Statutes and the
Sources of Law in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS (1934) 213, 220; Thayer,
Public Wrong and Private Action (1914) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 317;
and (2) the liberal construction given the married women's
statutes, usually phrased as affecting property rights only, but
interpreted so that the old common law doctrines in every field
of law-tort, contract and criminal-were modified to fit the
general statutory aims, Garret v. State, 109 Ind. 527, 10 N.E.
570 (1886); State v. Renslow, 211 Iowa 642, 230 N.W. 316 (1980) ;
Landis, supra at 222. Such an interpretation is the minority rule,
however. Dressler v. State 194 Ind. 8, 141 N.E. 801 (1923);
note (1930) 71 A.L.R. 1116.
26 Foreseeability is a limitation of liability after it is found that the
conduct of the master's business Was a contributing cause of the
servant starting the car. See Smith, supra note 6, at 720. Also
see Seavey, supra note 11, at 435; Douglas, loc. cit. supra note 6.
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is liable for the negligence of his servant in performing the act.17 The
servant is commandeered only because he is in control of the needed
equipment, and not in his individual capacity. What is wanted is the
entire unit-the truck of the corporation, and the servant because he
is the driver or custodian of that truck.' s This argument seems to
distinguish the cases where a servant is commandeered for his physical
aid alone.
Only a dry application of classical agency principles supports the
majority's position.' 9 It has been held that when a servant is called
upon to give only his physical aid in law enforcement he passes from
the scope of his employment and the general master is thereby relieved
from liability.20 Thus the municipality, through its police officer, is
in the position of a special employer with complete control over the
servant and hence the general employer should no longer be held re-
sponsible. This is true whether he was commandeered as an individual
or as servant in charge of needed equipment.21 But the application of
rules from private agency situations seems unsound. The servant's dut"
to assist in law enforcement should not be a shield for his master.
C. J. 13.
17 See Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726(1928) for the application of the test there. Also see note (1938)
1 Ga. B.J. 60 for the application of the test to Bindert v. Elm.
hurst Taxi Co., 168 Misc. 892, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 666 (N.Y. City Ct.
1938).
lB "It (the officer's order) was directed to him, not merely as an in-
dividual or passerby, a man of muscle or marksmanship, but as
the custodian and driver of the defendant's vehicle. Had he not
been such, it would not have been given to him." Rutledge, J.
dissenting in Balinovic v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 113 F.(2d) 505, 508 (App. D.C. 1940).
1J Denton v. Yazoo and M. V. R. R., 284 U.S. 305 (1932); Phelps
v. Boone, 67 F. (2d) 574 (App. D.C. 1933). cert. denied,
291 U.S. 677 (1933); Executrix v. Messick, 92 Ind. App. 264, 173
N.E. 238 (1930); RESTATEMENT AGENCY (1934) § 228, comment c.
Illinois has an unusual rule holding'that the relationship of master
and servant does not exist unless the control of the servant in-
cludes the power to discharge him. Schluraff v. Shoreline Motor
Coach Co., 269 Ill. App. 569 (1933). In this case there is dictum
to the effect that the commandeering of a bus driver will not af-
fect the master-servant relationship.2 0 Kennelly v. Stearns Salt and Lumber Co., 190 Mich. 628, 157 N.W.
378 (1916) (Workmen's compensation); Geary v. Stevenson, 169
Mass. 23, 47 N.E. 508 (1897) (respondeat superior).21 In New Omaha Thomson-Houston Elec. Light Co. v. Anderson, 73
Neb. 84, 102 N.W. 89 (1905) the defendant utility company was
required by a city ordinance to have a lineman at the scene
of all fires in the city for the purpose of removing or warning of
dangerous fires that might injure firemen or endanger property.
Because of the alleged negligence of the defendant's lineman the
plaintiff's intestate was killed. Although the lineman was not
commandeered because he was in control of needed equipment,
he was commandeered because he possessed needed skill and knowl-
edge peculiar to his employment; however the court denied liability,
one reason for the decision being that the servant was under the
control and direction of the city.
